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Expanding the Taxonomy of (Mis-)Recognition in 
the Economic Sphere 
 
Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition makes a number of contributions. It clarifies the 
concept of recognition and explains why it is crucial for self-realisation and a positive 
relation to self. Furthermore, it enables us to conceive of liberal democratic societies, and 
by implication their capitalist economic spheres, as recognition orders with immanent 
normative dynamics that fuel struggles for recognition.
1
 Our aim in this paper is to expand 
Honneth’s taxonomy of (mis-)recognition in the economic sphere.
2
 We argue, firstly, that 
one key move when it comes to expanding the taxonomy of (mis-recognition) in the market 
sphere consists in tracking demands for recognition that are grounded not just in esteem, 
but also in (various aspects of) need and respect. Secondly, we maintain that with regard to 
each of these three principles of recognition – need, esteem and respect – we have to 
distinguish a productive from a consumptive dimension in order to do justice to the variety 
of ways in which recognition is engaged in economic relationships.  
 There are a number of benefits associated with our expanded taxonomy of (mis-
)recognition in the economic sphere: It accounts for why we are confronted with such a 
diverse range of struggles for recognition. It shows that a whole range of phenomena can be 
understood as instances of misrecognition that previously have received little attention 
from recognition theorists, and it brings structure into these diverse phenomena by 
associating them with distinct demands for recognition.  
 In what follows, we first provide an overview of key features of Axel Honneth’s 
theory of recognition and how it bears on the economic sphere. We then explain the ways 
in which our own account builds on Honneth’s and goes beyond it. Against this backdrop, 
we then develop our expanded taxonomy of (mis-)recognition in the economic sphere. The 
basic structure of this taxonomy is composed of the following categories: need 
(productive/consumptive), esteem (productive/consumptive), and respect 
(productive/consumptive). In the conclusion, we argue that our expanded taxonomy 
amounts to a useful resource for theorists of social pathology. It is not our aim here to 
provide an overview of different notions of social pathology. We also do not defend or apply 
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a particular account of social pathology. Instead, we raise awareness for the range of 
instances of misrecognition in the economic sphere which will be helpful for those who are 
in the business of diagnosing pathologies of misrecognition in that sphere. 
Honneth’s Theory of Recognition and the Economic Sphere 
 
For Honneth, recognition denotes a reciprocal relationship in which the relating individuals 
participate both as recogniser and recognisee. The act of recognition is said to track 
‘positive qualities’ (Honneth, 2002: 505) of the recognised individuals (e.g. their capacity for 
rational deliberation) that give the recogniser a reason to treat the recognisee with (moral) 
consideration. Relationships of recognition are mediated by recognition norms. These 
norms specify what kind of consideration a recognised individual is due in terms of the 
behaviour of the recogniser. Recognition norms thus structure our interactions with others 
in a way that takes into account that the recognised individual is seen as possessing certain 
valuable properties. According to Honneth, human beings possess different kinds of 
valuable properties. Recognition therefore ‘represents a conceptual species’ that comprises 
different ‘subspecies’ (Honneth, 2002: 506). Each subspecies tracks a different valuable 
property which, in turn, underpins a distinct recognition relationship.  
 On the level of social theory, we can distinguish different recognition orders 
according to the value properties they track. We can compare recognition orders according 
to the value properties they track; and if they track the same value properties, we can 
compare their recognition norms, that is, the norms that tell individuals what kind of 
consideration they can expect from others. Honneth highlights that recognition orders can 
change considerably over time. We can speak of a normative revolution if existing norms of 
recognition are replaced by new ones. For instance, the transition from the ‘estate-based 
order of pre-modern society’ to the modern ‘bourgeois-capitalist society’ (Honneth, 2003: 
138) amounts to a normative revolution since the ‘pre-modern concept of honor’ was 
replaced, on the one hand, by a ‘democratized’ notion of equal legal respect which tracks 
decision-making capacity, and, on the other, by a ‘meritocratized’ (Honneth, 2003: 141) 
notion of esteem which tracks individuals’ contributions to society (Jütten, forthcoming; 
Schaub, 2015: 108-109). By contrast, we are dealing with normative reform if struggles for 
recognition bring about a change in how given recognition norms are interpreted, typically 
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to render the scope of their application or their content less biased (Honneth, 2003: 186-
187; Honneth 2018: 914-915). For instance, the on-going struggle to arrive at an 
understanding of work and achievement that adequately takes into account socially 
valuable contributions like ‘housework and childcare’ (Honneth, 2003: 153) could be 
interpreted as being about the meaning of and scope of application for the recognition 
norm ‘esteem’.  
 Honneth says that ‘the mutual granting of recognition’ (Honneth, 2003: 138) is 
historically variable.  He also claims that among this variability, there can be moral progress. 
Shifts from one recognition order to another, or transformations of the way in which 
recognition norms are interpreted, amount to progress if at least one of following two 
conditions are met: First, such transformations have to increase ‘social inclusion’ (Honneth, 
2002: 511). The successful struggle of the women’s movement for equal political rights can 
serve as a case in point as it expanded the scope of application of the recognition norm of 
(equal political) respect beyond men. Second, transformations are progressive if they lead 
to ‘increases in individuality’ (Honneth, 2002: 511). This can either happen by way of 
tracking additional valuable properties that have previously not been recognised at all, or by 
way of generating a more differentiated and less biased interpretation of existing 
recognition norms. For instance, once it is recognised that human beings are vulnerable 
beings, then we can ask if our recognition norms could be improved such that more 
dimensions of human vulnerability are taken adequately into account (e.g. not just 
individuals’ emotional needs but also their material and developmental needs).  
 According to Honneth, the bourgeois-capitalist recognition order that is 
characteristic of our liberal democratic societies evolved out of ‘estate-based’ (Honneth, 
2003: 138) social orders familiar from the period before the French Revolution. It is 
characterised by three spheres of recognition underpinned by three different norms of 
recognition: love, respect, and esteem. Following Hegel, Honneth claims that while tracking 
different valuable properties of individuals, norms of recognition also underpin and give 
shape to distinct ‘institutionalized’ societal ‘spheres’ (Honneth, 2003: 138). Love or 
‘affective recognition’ (Honneth, 2003: 138-139) grounds personal relationships like 
intimate relationships and friendships. Such relations are expressive of ‘attitudes of care’ 
and track that human beings are ‘needy beings’ (Honneth, 2003: 139). The point of these 
personal relationships of ‘loving care’ is the fulfilment of certain affective and ‘bodily … 
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needs’ (Honneth, 2003: 139). The sphere of personal relationships is complemented by two 
other social spheres: A legal and political sphere that is underpinned by the recognition 
norm of (equal) respect tracking human beings’ shared capacity for rational decision-making 
and moral responsibility (Honneth, 2003: 141), and an economic sphere in which individuals 
(who recognise each other as equal legal subjects) compete for esteem by making valuable 
contributions to social cooperation on the basis of their productive capacities (Honneth, 
2003: 142). For Honneth, the ‘meritocratized’ recognition norm of ‘social esteem’ (Honneth, 
2003: 141) is the key legitimising notion of the modern economic sphere.  
Going beyond Honneth: (Mis-)Recognition in the Economic Sphere  
 
Honneth’s framing of the economic sphere had the effect of unduly narrowing the focus of 
debates about (mis-)recognition in the economic sphere to issues related to what we call 
production-esteem. These debates deal with issues like the following: What counts as an 
achievement, or valuable contribution, to social cooperation? Is financial remuneration 
always the right currency for recognising achievements (an issue that is, for instance, 
pertinent when it comes to activities like raising children)? Is the market a mechanism for 
tracking achievement, or could it be turned into such a mechanism? What counts as 
adequate recognition with respect to different kinds of contributions to social cooperation 
(Honneth, 2003; Jütten 2017; Smith 2009)?  
 In our view, all of these debates about production-esteem are important. However, 
one (often implicitly made) assumption that underpins them is that issues surrounding 
production-esteem are treated as the main way in which recognition is at stake in the 
economic sphere. We argue that recognition is present in more varied ways in economic 
relations. In fact, we can only arrive at a picture that does justice to this diversity if we go 
beyond these debates that focus on production-esteem. First, apart from esteem, the 
recognition norms of need and respect are also in play. Since it is constitutive of modern 
market relations that individuals encounter each other as equal legal subjects it is implied by 
Honneth’s own account that respect is part and parcel of economic relations. Below, we 
outline some of the ways in which the norm of respect is invoked by those participating in 
(struggles for recognition in) the economic sphere. We also argue for a reframing of how 
Honneth takes into account need-based recognition relationships. We claim that need is a 
 5
recognition norm that comprises different subspecies (of which love recognition is one). We 
develop a more differentiated picture of need-based recognition relationships (in the 
economic sphere), since not all of them can be adequately captured in terms of love 
recognition. To generate such a differentiated picture, one has to show, on the one hand, 
that all variants of need-based recognition form part of the same conceptual species since 
they are all tracking human needs. On the other hand, one has to demonstrate that it is 
possible to differentiate between subspecies of need recognition according to the different 
kinds of needs they track. This amounts to a re-working of Honneth’s view, but the changes 
we propose do not contradict any of the basic tenets of his recognition theory. In fact, 
Honneth himself frames love recognition as tracking the fact that human beings are ‘needy 
beings’ (Honneth, 2003: 139; Honneth 1995, 18). What is more, he points out that love 
recognition is responsive to particular subspecies of human needs: i.e. certain ‘affective’ and 
‘bodily needs’ that are typically fulfilled in relationships between children and parents, 
between lovers, and between friends (Honneth, 2003: 138-39; Honneth, 2014: 132-176; 
Zurn 2015, 28-31). To account for other subspecies of need-based recognition thus requires, 
on the one hand, to identify other kinds of needs (like the need to develop and exercise 
one’s productive capacities) that ground claims for (moral) consideration and, on the other, 
to identify the social spheres concerned with the satisfaction of these needs. 
 Expanding the taxonomy of (mis-)recognition also requires to distinguish a 
productive from a consumptive dimension of need, esteem, and respect recognition. This 
distinction is introduced by Honneth in Freedom’s Right, where he claims that a normative 
reconstruction of economic relations cannot just look at the production dimension of this 
sphere (Honneth, 2014: 223-253), but has to also take into consideration its consumption 
dimension (Honneth, 2014: 198-223). Due to this shift, Honneth now at least makes 
mention of a whole range of issues in the economic sphere (from sick pay to consumer 
protections) that he has hitherto neglected because of his focus on issues of production-
esteem. We welcome this broadening of scope that takes place in Freedom’s Right. What 
Honneth, unfortunately, fails to do in this monograph is to attempt to categorise the range 
of economic injustices, which he now considers, as instances of different kinds of 
misrecognition.  
 In sum, our expanded taxonomy of (mis-)recognition in the economic sphere builds 
on Honneth’s insights, but avoids some of the shortcomings of his account. First, we argue 
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that not only esteem recognition but also (variants of) need and respect recognition form 
part and parcel of economic relations. Second, we show that with regards to esteem, 
respect and need recognition, we have to distinguish a productive from a consumptive 
dimension. On this basis, we account for the diverse injustices in economic relations as 
particular instances of (mis-)recognition of (productive/consumptive) need, 
(productive/consumptive) esteem, or (productive/consumptive) respect. Finally, we draw 
attention to the fact that the economic sphere encompasses different kinds of economic 
relationships – e.g. between producers and consumers (Honneth 2014: 208, 210), 
employers and employees, consumers and consumers – that condition the demands for 
recognition arising in this sphere. By modifying and expanding Honneth’s account in these 
ways, we can develop a better understanding of the wide range of struggles for recognition 
in the economic sphere. 
(Mis-)Recognition: An Expanded Taxonomy 
 
We can now outline and defend our expanded taxonomy of (mis-)recognition in the 
economic sphere. We look at the different norms of recognition and identify the various 
valuable properties that ground the respective demands for recognition. We also explain 
why these demands form part of the economic sphere, clarify what kind of recognition 
relationship is at stake, and provide case studies from the real world.  
 
Productive Need  
We begin with need-based recognition relationships. Such relationships track different kinds 
of needs that give us reasons to show some kind of (moral) consideration towards others. 
We first look at different needs that ground demands for recognition related to our 
productive activity. In doing so, we invoke an idea that is familiar from the history of 
philosophy as it can be found in Aristotle, Hegel, Marx and Rawls: namely, that ‘man is an 
essentially productive being’ (Wolff 2017) or ‘working species’ (Braverman 1998: 316). Being 
active and productive (in an appropriate way) thus counts among the needs of human 
beings (Yeoman, 2014: 8-38). 
 Human beings have developmental and exercise needs that have to be taken into 
consideration in how we organise productive cooperation. This comes out in Rawls’ 
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discussion of the ‘Aristotelian Principle’ that invokes some ‘general facts about human 
needs’ that are ‘clear enough’ (Rawls 1999: 373) to draw some conclusions from them 
regarding how we should live. One of these facts is the need human beings feel to train their 
‘capacities’ and ‘realize’ (Rawls, 1999: 376) them. Rawls maintains that ‘other things being 
equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities …, and this enjoyment 
increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity’ (Rawls 1999: 374). 
What is spelled out here are the conditions pertaining to human beings’ productive activity 
under which they can develop a positive relation to self. The Aristotelian Principle thus 
accounts for our need to develop and exercise our capacities – at least up to the point 
where further improving our capacities becomes more strenuous than the satisfaction we 
derive from exercising our improved capacities.  
 If these assumptions are, by and large, correct, then we have identified two needs 
related to human productive activity that can be ascribed to children and adults alike. We 
call them developmental and exercise needs. The former denotes a need to further develop 
one’s skills and the latter the opportunity to exercise them. These needs form part of the 
economic sphere by virtue of the fact that in the case of adults in full-time employment, the 
greatest part of their productive activity takes place during working hours. It is full-time 
employment itself that makes it such that one can hardly fulfil these needs outside of one’s 
employment. This is what gives rise to the demand that employers have to recognise the 
developmental and exercise needs of their employees, for instance, by providing them 
throughout their working life with opportunities for further developing their capacities and 
to then entrust them with tasks that enable them to exercise their newly developed ‘skills 
and discriminations’ (Rawls, 1999: 375). Developmental and exercise needs form a kind of 
unity. For further developing one’s capacities has the effect that one’s previous tasks now 
appear ‘simpler’ and no longer as ‘sufficiently interesting or attractive’, with the result that 
doing them is no longer ‘enjoyed’ as much as ‘before’ (Rawls 1999: 375). 
 It is not our aim to discuss in detail how employees’ developmental and exercise 
needs can be met, we simply want to establish that the relationship between employer and 
employee can give rise to specific struggles aimed at overcoming obstacles that are in the 
way of employees fulfilling these needs. Such struggles are about enabling, as far as 
possible, employees’ opportunities for satisfying their ‘preference for ascending the chain or 
chains which offer the greatest prospect of exercising the higher abilities with the least 
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stress’ (Rawls, 1999: 377). To put the same point negatively, employees’ complaints about 
‘work that requires neither skill nor initiative’ and is ‘repetitive’ (Honneth, 2014: 237; also 
238, 240; Durkheim, 1964: 371ff.) is best understood as a variant of need misrecognition.
3
 In 
order to fully appreciate what is at stake with regards to this variant of misrecognition, one 
has to connect it to the venerable debate about ‘the development of labour under 
capitalism’ (Foster, 1998: xviii), for which Adam Smith’s (2008) praise of the division of 
labour served as a prelude. In a seminal contribution to this debate, Harry Braverman 
argues that ‘the incessant breakdown of labor processes into simplified operations’ is a 
permanent feature of modern capitalist production, which, in turn, ‘leads to the conversion 
of the greatest possible mass of labor into work of the most elementary form, labor from 
which … most of the skill, knowledge, and understanding of production processes’ 
(Braverman 1998: 319) has been removed.
4
  If Braverman is right, then we have to see the 
demand for recognising employees’ developmental and exercise needs as occurring against 
the backdrop of a ‘general tendency’ leading to the ‘deskilling’ of the majority of workers, 
which results ‘from the managerial imperatives of capitalism’ such as the ‘unending quest 
for profitability’ and reducing ‘unit wage’ (Foster, 1998: xviii-xx; Braverman 1998: 294-295).  
 Developmental and exercise needs are productive in the narrow sense. However, 
such needs are not the only ones at stake in the production-dimension of economic 
relations. The bodily and psychological vulnerability of human beings also gives rise to 
health and safety needs that shape the recognition relationship between employer and 
employee. Employers have a duty of care to their employees since they use and benefit 
from their labour. For example, UK employers have an obligation to take all reasonable 
steps to protect their employees’ health, safety and wellbeing.
5
  
 There are even emotional needs which employers have to recognise, pace Honneth, 
who relegates all emotional needs to personal relationships. Consider, for example, the on-
going debates about what kind of support employers ought to offer employees in case of a 
bereavement. In the UK, many ‘employees have the statutory right to a “reasonable” 
amount of unpaid time off under the Employment Rights Act’ (Landau 2014) and in Australia 
all ‘employees (including casual employees) are entitled to compassionate leave’.
6
 What is 
at stake here is the struggle to get employers to recognise certain emotional needs of their 
employees, not just their health needs. For the entitlement of employees to go on 
bereavement leave is irrespective of the anticipated effects on the health of the grieving 
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individuals. The obligation of employers to recognise this emotional need results from the 
fact that only employers are able to fulfil it (i.e. by granting employees leave from work).  
 
Consumptive Need  
Needs are also at stake in the consumptive dimension of economic cooperation. The 
economic sphere forms part of human societies since human beings have to engage in 
productive cooperation in order to meet their basic material needs (Braverman 1998: 316). 
In this sense, material needs are constitutive of economic relations and denote one kind of 
need that is tracked by relationships of consumption recognition. The fundamental role 
material needs play for the modern economic sphere is reflected, for instance, by Hegel 
who entitled the section dedicated to the market in his Philosophy of Right (1821): ‘the 
system of needs’ (Hegel, 1991: §§184-195).
7
 For Honneth, we cannot account for the 
universal acceptability of the modern market unless we invoke the promise that all can 
contribute to productive cooperation and that everyone contributing earns enough to 
satisfy their basic material needs (Honneth, 2014: 203, 209, 252). Against the backdrop of 
this normative promise, we can speak of instances of misrecognition of individuals’ material 
needs, whenever some lack basic goods because they are, against their will, excluded from 
cooperating, or lack basic goods such as ‘affordable food, clothing and housing’ (Honneth 
2014: 201) despite cooperating, and this situation is one that could have been avoided. Such 
instances of consumption misrecognition can motivate struggles for the recognition of basic 
material needs. The addressees of such struggles for recognition vary. Sometimes 
misrecognised consumers aim to convince fellow consumers to back as citizens changes to 
how the economic sphere is regulated, so that all earn enough to satisfy their basic material 
needs. Sometimes unions exert pressure on particular employers to pay a living wage, that 
is, a wage that allows everybody working full-time to avail themselves of all necessary basic 
goods. In any case, we are always dealing with ‘moral reactions to events in the market-
mediated sphere of consumption’ (Honneth, 2014: 202) that take place against the 
backdrop of its normative promise. Material needs also underpin other demands made by 
employees. Think, for instance, of statutory sick pay (Honneth, 2014: 229). Need-based 
recognition claims often end up taking on the form of rights (e.g. of employees) or legal 
obligations (e.g. of employers or the state). Once this happens, any instance of need 
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misrecognition is linked with an instance of disrespect, as the individuals in question would 
also be violated as legal subjects. However, the fact that particular need-based demands are 
transformed into right-based claims and corresponding legal obligations, and thereby 
moved into the domain of respect, does not change the fact that the recognition claim is 
grounded in a distinct need. In short, needs underpin the recognition claim even if rights are 
the means of protecting their fulfilment. 
 Human beings are not only bodily and psychologically vulnerable as workers but also 
as consumers. This vulnerability gives rise to a whole range of protective claims consumers 
have against producers. By now, there is – in many countries and transnational entities like 
the EU (Devenney and Kenny, 2012) – a whole ‘system of consumer protection’ (Honneth 
2014: 204) in place that ensures, for instance, that products are reliable and safe to use or 
consume. These protections also extend to how companies are allowed to promote their 
products. Honneth speaks in this respect of a general acknowledgement of consumers’ 
‘right to health’ and ‘safety’ (Honneth, 2014: 213; Hegel, 1991: §236).  
 To summarise, the notion of material need is constitutive of the economic sphere 
since we can neither make sense of the point of productive cooperation nor the universal 
acceptability of the modern market without it. Basic material needs underpin a range of 
struggles for recognition. In addition, there are also demands to protect the health and 
safety of consumers that are grounded in their bodily and psychological vulnerability. What 
this discussion of need recognition in the economic sphere brings to the fore is that 
economic relationships are ‘practices of … concern’ through which ‘individuals understand 
themselves as individuals’ whose various ‘needs’ (Honneth, 2003: 142) as bodily and 
psychologically vulnerable being matter, or ought to matter to others. Struggles for 
recognition of consumptive needs either aim to integrate dimensions of need that form part 
of economic relationships but have hitherto been neglected, or they are about taking 
already recognised needs into account in a more differentiated and comprehensive fashion. 
 
Production-Esteem  
This brings us to the notion of esteem and how it bears on the production dimension of the 
economic sphere. What is at stake here are the valuable contributions individuals make to 
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productive cooperation, that is, their individual achievements on the basis of which the 
‘social esteem’ of ‘“productive citizens”’ (Honneth, 2003: 141) is assessed.  
 As already mentioned, this aspect of recognition has taken centre stage in 
discussions about recognition and the economic sphere in Honneth’s early and middle 
period from Struggle for Recognition, published originally in 1992, to Recognition or 
Redistribution from 2003. Arguably, production-esteem is for this reason the most well-
established part of the taxonomy of (mis-)recognition in the economic sphere. What esteem 
recognition tracks are not just the productive capacities of individuals, but how (and how 
well) they use them to make valuable contributions to social cooperation. So, whenever an 
individual (or a group of individuals) is of the opinion that their valuable contributions to 
social cooperation are not adequately recognised, or esteemed (in comparison to others), 
then the preconditions for struggles for production-esteem recognition are in place. Think, 
for instance, about the struggle surrounding the recognition of care work.  
 Esteem recognition individualises in a way that recognising basic needs does not. It 
tracks something that is particular about the individual in question. For instance, we tend to 
assume that the way in which individuals choose to contribute to social cooperation (e.g. as 
a nurse or a plumber) is, at least to some degree, expressive of their preferences and talents 
(and thus of aspects of their identity). For this reason, freedom of occupation (against the 
backdrop of a range of meaningful options and fair access to education) plays an important 
role in the capitalist recognition order. For it guarantees that the way in which one 
contributes to social cooperation can itself be seen as an expression of individual freedom. 
Production-esteem is also individualising in another way. For it involves an evaluation of 
how well different individuals perform the same kind of tasks. For Honneth, the notion of 
‘individual achievement’ is the key ‘idea’ when it comes to legitimising socio-economic 
differences. Individual achievement is supposed to be the decisive factor with regards to the 
position each and every individual has ‘within the structure of the industrially organized 
division of labour’ (Honneth 2003: 140). One’s self-esteem thus depends on whether one 
(thinks one) receives adequate recognition for the kind of valuable contribution one makes 
to social cooperation, on the one hand, and for how well one contributes (compared to 
others doing similar things). In the former case, one issue at stake is the ‘cultural measure 
that determines the social esteem owed a particular activity’ (Honneth 2003: 140). Struggles 
for recognition involving this ‘cultural measure’ are addressed at the rest of society, for 
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those engaging in them aim to transform the socially accepted standards of evaluation 
themselves. In the latter case, the addressees of struggles for esteem recognition can be 
specific employers (e.g. the BBC) or sectors of the economy.
8
 
 There are still some issues pertaining to production-esteem that deserve more 
attention. For instance, if self-esteem is predicated not only on having one’s contributions 
to social cooperation adequately recognised, but also on being able to appreciate the value 
of one’s contribution, then it constitutes a problem if a significant number of people 
struggle to see the point or value of what they are doing for societally shared ends (Jütten, 
2017: 261-266). The problem here is that of meaningless work (Honneth, 2014: 237), or 
‘bullshit jobs’ (Graeber 2018). In other words, our economic system seems to encompass 
many jobs that require the development and exercise of skills (and thus do not 
straightforwardly violate individuals’ developmental and exercise needs), but which 
nonetheless do not enable those doing them to develop a sense of self-esteem.
9
 
 
Consumption-Esteem  
The topic of consumption-esteem constitutes another under-researched area of (mis-
)recognition. Like production-esteem, consumption-esteem is individualising and protecting 
a dimension of individual freedom. Despite not linking consumption with esteem, Honneth 
is right to maintain that consumption is a ‘form of individual freedom’ since ‘subjects would 
learn to see themselves as consumers who are free to determine their personal desires, and 
thus their identity, in the search for and acquisition of commodities’ (Honneth, 2014: 199). 
Similar to freely choosing the way in which one contributes to social cooperation, one’s 
consumptive activity can also be expressive of one’s freedom. For this to be the case, one’s 
consumptive activity has to track one’s identity, that is, reflect one’s individual tastes, 
preferences and ethical commitments. Consumption-esteem is thus about recognising, or 
confirming the value of, individuals’ preferences, tastes and ethical commitments, which 
account, at least to a certain degree, for a person’s individuality.  Struggles for consumption-
esteem are thus about ensuring that our consumptive behaviour is, at least to some degree, 
expressive of our identity, that we can recognise ourselves in the commodities we acquire. 
This individualising dimension of consumption-esteem takes us beyond fulfilling general and 
basic material needs (e.g. the need for nutritious food). And since consumption denotes a 
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distinct economic activity taking place in the market, consumption-esteem clearly belongs 
to the economic sphere.
10
  
 The notion of consumption-esteem can help us make sense of particular forms of 
economic misrecognition. For instance, it provides us with one reason for regarding it as 
problematic that more and more people have to regularly rely on food and clothes banks 
etc. to avail themselves of some basic goods. Presumably, individuals who rely on such 
services use them regularly because they have no other way of making ends meet. Our 
claim is that users of such services might satisfy (some of) their basic material needs (which 
is, of course, important), but this does not change the fact that they are suffering from 
consumption-esteem misrecognition. Compared to other consumers, they do not have the 
financial means to consume in ways that reflect, at least to a relevant degree, their 
individuality. By forcing them to regularly rely on such services, society communicates to 
them that their consumptive tastes and preferences do not matter. As a result, they cannot 
understand their consumptive preferences of being of value and their consumptive activity 
as being expressive of their identity. Their struggle as consumers is thus about overcoming a 
situation in which their consumption-esteem, and thus a dimension of their individual 
freedom, is not taken seriously (compared to other members of society whose consumption 
habits regularly track their tastes and who have a sense that their preferences are assigned 
a value by their society). To put this thought in more Hegelian terms: Only if the social world 
is arranged thus that what we consume is in relevant ways expressive of our identity, can 
our identity attain a degree of objectivity.
11
 The same reasoning applies to other aspects of 
individuals’ conception of the good.
12
 For instance, one could argue that it amounts to an 
instance of consumption-esteem misrecognition if mainstream supermarket chains cater for 
members of society requiring halal meals but not kosher food, or provide no decent options 
for vegans. Another case in point is the outrage ensuing the allegation that food companies 
sell, under the same brand, safe but ‘lower quality food products in some EU countries’.
13
 If 
true, such a practice would imply a form of consumption-esteem misrecognition since these 
companies would consider it to be acceptable to treat their customers in some countries of 
the EU worse than others (by supplying them with lower quality products).  
 In sum, questions about consumption-esteem recognition arise between consumers 
whenever some individuals or groups in society are significantly disadvantaged in terms of 
their opportunity to express their identity (that is, their tastes, preference and ethical 
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commitments) in their consumptive behaviour, or when they are treated as less valued 
consumers. What is more, there is the question of whether consumers can invoke the 
notion of consumption-esteem to demand from producers that they supply them with a 
range of products that track the diverse consumptive preferences and ethical commitments 
of all members of society. All of these issues deserve, of course, a more in-depth treatment. 
However, for our purposes it suffices to show that esteem recognition in the economic 
sphere is not reducible to production-esteem, that is, problems surrounding individual 
achievements. There is also a (mostly neglected) consumption-esteem dimension that 
needs to be taken into consideration.  
 
Production-Respect  
Respect tracks another valuable property of individuals: their capacity to rationally 
deliberate, make decisions and take (moral) responsibility for them. By being respected, 
individuals ‘learn to understand themselves as legal persons owed the same autonomy as all 
other members of society’ (Honneth, 2003: 142). Since it is a constitutive feature of the 
modern market that those interacting in it recognise each other as equal legal subjects, 
respect and esteem are both co-constitutive of modern economic relations. As a 
consequence, we can witness a whole range of struggles for respect recognition in the 
economic sphere.  
 One crucial way in which struggles for production-respect manifest themselves is in 
terms of demands for worker co-determination. Employees do not just have productive 
capacities that are valuable for their companies and need to be esteemed. Employers also 
have to respect their employees, that is, their deliberative and decision-making capacities 
(that are equal to those of the management representing the employer). Respecting 
employees thus means to be responsive to the demand ‘for active involvement of wage 
labourers in decision-making within the firm’ (Honneth, 2014: 249). This respect-grounded 
demand has become ‘a permanent element in the intellectual reservoir of the labour 
movement’ (Honneth, 2014: 239). The struggle for co-determination is one for respect and 
not (just) esteem since what employees continue to fight for is that adequate ‘discursive 
mechanisms’ and decision-making processes are put in place that grant ‘workers a certain 
amount of co-determination’ (Honneth, 2014: 238). It is true, workers’ demands for co-
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determination are in part about making sure that their voices are heard and adequately 
considered with regards to issues we are already familiar with from our discussion of 
productive need and production-esteem: e.g. ‘working conditions’ and ‘wages’ (Honneth, 
2014: 238). However, this does not mean that demands for production-respect are 
reducible to demands for productive need and production-esteem. What matters is not just 
that these demands are met, but also how they are met: there is the issue of whether there 
are decision-making procedures in place within companies that ensure that employees have 
a say in how these demands are dealt with. That production-respect is not reducible to 
productive need and production-esteem also becomes apparent in another way. Worker co-
determination expands the scope of relevant issues. Co-determination entails that 
employees are involved in the making of business decisions (about strategies, mergers etc.). 
Furthermore, worker co-determination is also about making sure that wider ‘public 
interests’ are taken into account in ‘processes of economic decision making’ (Honneth, 
2014: 239), not just short term profit interests.
14
  
 There is no doubt that workers’ success in establishing co-determination is very 
limited to date, as is their success in defending what they had already achieved against 
persistent attempts to undermine these achievements.
15
 But this does not change the fact 
that the idea of production-respect remains a resource that workers can invoke to support 
their on-going struggle for the ultimate aim of ‘economic democracy’ (Honneth, 2014: 238) 
or democracy in the work place. 
 
Consumption-Respect  
Having explored the issue of production-respect in the previous section, we now consider 
how struggles for respect recognition show up in the consumptive dimension. In our view, 
we are dealing with instances of consumption-disrespect whenever consumers’ capacity to 
deliberate and make decisions or their moral responsibility is undermined, that is, if 
consumers face unnecessary obstacles that prevent them from making informed choices 
about what products to acquire.  
 Consumers are misled, when they are exposed to a form of communication that 
‘compromises good judgement’ by way of ‘interfering’ with the process, or ‘form’ (Cohen, 
2017: 4), of decision-making. Think, for instance, of advertisements that systematically 
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exploit psychological and emotional weaknesses of consumers (Honneth, 2014: 200-1, 214). 
Deception constitutes another form of consumption-disrespect. It ‘undermines judgement 
by interfering with its input (content)’ (Cohen, 2017: 4; Noggle, 1996: 43-55). Consider, for 
instance, companies that provide consumers with misleading or inaccurate accounts of 
(features of) their products. The recent Diesel emission scandal involving Volkswagen can 
server as a case in point (McGee, 2017). Producers are, in other words, under an obligation 
to respect consumers by way of ‘adequately’ informing them ‘about the … quality of goods’ 
and by refraining from ‘unfair competitive methods such as false advertising’ (Honneth, 
2014: 206).  
 What is more, since the notion of respect also covers individuals’ capacity for taking 
(moral) responsibility for their actions, the category of consumption-respect can be invoked 
to demand that costumers can easily find out about the conditions under which goods are 
produced (Stehr 2008). For a sufficient degree of transparency in this regard is a 
precondition for enabling consumers to consume in ways they consider morally defensible 
(Honneth, 2014: 216-7). Let us mention a number of those (morally) salient production 
conditions that might have to be disclosed by companies in order to take consumers 
seriously as moral subjects. First of all, there is the issue of the working conditions of those 
producing a consumer good (e.g. have basic health and safety standards been met, are 
workers allowed to form unions, are they paid a living wage, are child-labour or degrading 
conditions involved?). This concern can be illustrated by the anti-sweatshop movement and 
sweatfree tags in clothing. Furthermore, there is the question of the environmental 
footprint of the product (Honneth, 2014: 215). Does the company emit an excessive amount 
of pollutants (e.g. what is the carbon footprint of the product in question)? Finally, it could 
be argued that respecting consumers also entails an obligation to make them aware of 
salient issues surrounding international law, human rights, and the fuelling of conflicts. The 
European Commission’s Interpretative Notice (2015/C 375/05) which states ‘that goods 
made in territories occupied by Israel since June 1967, namely the West Bank, the Golan 
Heights and East Jerusalem, must be explicitly labelled as such’ can serve as an example 
here, or the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme that is supposed to ensure that so-
called ‘conflict diamonds’ do not enter the market (Bieri 2010).
16
  
 With our expanded taxonomy of (mis-)recogntion in place, we can now also 
appreciate how it strengthens and clarifies, for instance, Honneth’s discussion of consumer 
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co-operatives (Honneth, 2014: 208-211, 217-222). Such co-opertives are, on the one hand, 
about material consumptive needs. They serve as a counter to the power of corporations 
vis-à-vis consumers by bundling the latter’s buying power to improve their bargaining 
position. Like this, consumers can better secure cheaper priced goods, influence what is 
produced, and ensure that people’s material needs are met (by way of internally 
distributing goods in a way not based on individuals’ purchasing power). But consumer co-
operatives also engage the dimension of consumption-respect. For they can be about 
challenging manipulative influences that large corporations excert. Like this they strengthen 
a collective form of decision-making regarding what and how goods are produced. 
 Consumption-esteem and consumption-respect both involve exercises of choice. 
However, in the former case, we are concerned with what is often referred to as (aspects 
of) individuals’ conception of the good (their preferences, tastes, ethical and religious 
commitments etc.), whereas in the latter case, we are dealing with the protection of 
individuals’ decision-making capacities and moral responsibility (e.g. for the environment, 
the upholding of acceptable working conditions).  
 Demands for consumption-respect are thus another source of struggles for 
recognition in the economic sphere that mainly concern the relationship between 
consumers and producers. Part of this on-going struggle concerns issues like the following: 
What levels of transparency about which aspects of products and conditions of production 
are called for in order to enable consumers to adequately exercise their moral responsibility 
with regards to the goods they acquire? What is more, there are difficult questions about 
what does count as undermining of consumers’ decision-making capacity. Finally, there is 
the issue of whether consumers need to establish collective-deliberative mechanisms in 
order to exert more influence over what is produced and how. 
 
Dimension 
of 
economy / 
Norms of 
recognition 
Production Dimension  Consumption Dimension 
Need Developmental and exercise needs 
• Recognised property: human 
beings’ need to develop and 
exercise their (developed) 
capacities  
Material needs 
• Recognised property: human 
beings’ need for certain basic 
goods to physically reproduce 
themselves 
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• Examples of misrecognition: 
monotonous work, lack of 
skills-development 
opportunities 
Health and safety needs 
• Recognised property: the 
bodily and psychological 
vulnerability of workers 
• Example of misrecognition: 
unsafe working conditions 
Emotional needs 
• Recognised property: the fact 
that certain emotional needs of 
employees can only be met by 
employers 
• Example of misrecognition: not 
granting employees a 
reasonable amount of 
compassionate and 
bereavement leave  
• Examples of misrecognition: 
unemployment related poverty, no 
living wage 
 
Health and safety needs 
• Recognised property: the bodily 
and psychological vulnerability of 
consumers 
• Example of misrecognition: unsafe 
products 
 
Esteem  Production-esteem 
• Recognised property: the value 
of the contributions individuals 
make to social cooperation  
• Examples of misrecognition: 
biased cultural standards that 
undervalue certain 
contributions (e.g. care work), 
gender pay-gap, meaningless 
work 
 
Consumption-esteem  
• Recognised property: individuals’ 
preferences and ethical 
commitments (the value of which 
is confirmed if their consumptive 
activities reflect these aspects of 
their identity)   
• Examples of misrecognition: 
reliance on food banks, being 
treated as less valued consumer, 
failure to supply a meaningful 
range of products that take into 
consideration the diverse ethical 
commitments of consumers 
Respect Production-respect 
• Recognised property: the 
capacity of workers to 
rationally deliberate and take 
(moral) responsibility for their 
actions 
• Examples of misrecognition: 
prohibition of unions, denial of 
meaningful worker co-
determination 
Consumption-respect 
• Recognised property: the capacity 
of consumers to rationally 
deliberate and take (moral) 
responsibility for their actions 
• Examples of misrecognition: 
manipulation and deception of 
consumers, insufficient 
transparency regarding conditions 
of production 
Figure 1. Diagrammatical representation of (mis-)recognition in the economic sphere 
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Conclusion: Misrecognition and Pathologies in the Economic Sphere  
In this paper, we presented and defended an expanded taxonomy of (mis-)recognition in 
the economic sphere. Our taxonomy tracked recognition claims that are grounded in 
different aspects of need, esteem and respect. Furthermore, we argued that doing justice to 
the diversity of struggles for recognition in the economic sphere requires  
distinguishing with regard to all three principles of recognition – i.e. need, esteem and 
respect – between a productive and a consumptive dimension and identifying what kind of 
economic relationship is at stake (i.e. between employers and employees).  
 To conclude, we briefly want to come back to the issue of the relationship between 
our expanded taxonomy of misrecognition and attempts to diagnose pathologies of 
misrecognition. Identifying an instance of misrecognition in the economic sphere is not the 
same as diagnosing a social pathology since the latter task requires an additional step. 
However, our expanded taxonomy is a useful tool for social pathology theorists. For if one is 
in the business of diagnosing pathologies of misrecognition in the market sphere, one has to 
appreciates the full range of variants of misrecognition that forms part of the economic 
sphere.
17
 However, when it comes to evaluating whether particular instances of 
misrecognition are indicative of a social pathology one has to draw on, and apply, the 
account of social pathology one considers to be most convincing. The Frankfurt School, of 
which Axel Honneth is a proponent, endorses, for example, a distinct notion of social 
pathology that encompasses five interconnected elements, which are interpreted in 
different ways by different members of the Frankfurt School (Honneth 2009, 19-42): First, 
they all believe that reason is socially effective since norms are supposed to underpin social 
spheres. Second, a society as a whole, or a sub-sphere of it (like the economic sphere), can 
fail to life up to its rational potential if it does not realise the norms underlying it as 
comprehensively as possible. Thirdly, they give sociological explanations (invoking macro-
social entities like social structures and processes) to explain why a society fails to live up to 
its rational potential (Freyenhagen, forthcoming). Fourthly, Frankfurt School theorists 
assume that the failure of a society to live up to its rational potential negatively impacts the 
opportunity of its members to realise themselves which, in turn, brings about social 
suffering and an emancipatory interest in overcoming the rational deficits marring the 
society in question. Against the backdrop of this admittedly very brief sketch of the 
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Frankfurt School’s distinct notion of pathology, one can already sense how much 
philosophical (and sociological) work is required to defend and apply it. It is, however, 
important to note that neither the approach of the Frankfurt School to pathology nor 
Honneth’s specific recognition-theoretical interpretation of it is the only game in town.
18
 
Frederick Neuhouser (2012), for instance, developed on the basis of his reading of Rousseau 
an alternative notion of pathology as self-perpetuating and worsening negative dynamics 
that dovetails with our expanded taxonomy since Rousseau – like Honneth – gives pride of 
place to human beings’ desire for recognition when explaining social misdevelopments.  
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1
 For an overall account of Honneth’s theory of recognition, see Zurn (2015). It is now widely 
acknowledged that the model of recognition can make sense of some aspects of the 
economic sphere. However, many argue that other systemic factors not reducible to issues 
related to recogntion also shape outcomes in the economic sphere (Fraser, 2003).  
2
 The need for such a widening is in part due the fact that with regards to the economic 
sphere, the early and middle Honneth’s focus – and by implication the focus of most of his 
readers – was almost entirely on what we call production-esteem (Honneth, 2003: 150-159; 
Zurn, 2015: 127-154). The picture changed with the publication of Freedom’s Right in 2011, 
but it still remained too narrow. Moreover, the discussion has since then shifted to the issue 
of whether the market is, or could be, a sphere of social freedom (Honneth, 2014: 176-252; 
Jütten, 2015).  
3
 For the purposes of this paper, we distinguish between monotonous or repetitive work 
and meaningless work. In the latter case, we have in mind productive activities that, in the 
view of those engaging in them, do not make a valuable contribution to society (irrespective 
of whether the activity is repetitive or highly complex).  
4
 It is important to note that the same managerial imperative that drives the ‘systematic 
deskilling’ of most work (Foster 1998: xvi) also underpins the aim ‘to further divide workers 
and centralize control’ (Foster 1998: xvi), which, in turn, undermines what we call 
production respect (Braverman 1998: 26-27).   
5
 See The National Archives (1974) Health and Safety at Work etc Act. Available at:  
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http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/37/contents (accessed 17 May 2018).  
For a transnational example, see The International Labour Organisation (1981) Convention 
concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the Working Environment. Available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C
155 (accessed 17 May 2018).  
6
 Australian Government: Fair Work Ombudsman (2018) Compassionate & Bereavement 
Leave. Available at: 
https://www.fairwork.gov.au/leave/compassionate-and-bereavement-leave (accessed 17 
May 2018). 
7
 Already Hegel noticed that the market is not only about the satisfaction of material needs 
like ‘food, drink, clothing, etc.’ (Hegel, 1991: §189A) but also about generating needs that 
are sensitive to the opinions of others (Hegel, 1991: §191; Honneth, 2014: 199). 
8
 See, for instance, BBC News (2018) for some pay gap stories involving female employees of 
the BBC. 
9
 Unlike integrative accounts of meaningful work that tend to focus on the overlap between 
different dimensions, our aim here is to discern the different types of recognition that are at 
stake. Yeoman, for instance, argues that for work to be meaningful it has to have a certain 
‘interior content’ and ‘structure’ (Yeoman, 2014: 23). We consider this aspect that pertains 
to the nature of the task in our discussion of developmental and exercise needs. Yeoman 
also states that we must be able to see our contributions as valuable from a point of view 
that belongs to ‘an at least notional community’ (Wolf, 2010: 26). As we have just pointed 
out, this aspect is an issue of production-esteem according to our account. Finally, Yeoman 
argues that individuals are ‘more likely’ to experience their work as meaningful ‘when it is 
organised democratically’ (Yeoman, 2014: 5) since this means they are involved in 
‘interpreting, shaping, and ordering purposes’ (Yeoman, 2014: 32). We cover this aspect as 
part of our discussion of production-respect.   
10
 The (problematic) relationship between consumption and social standing is another 
venerable topic in modern social and economic theory. Authors like Rousseau (Neuhouser 
2013), Veblen (2007), and Bourdieu (1979) focus on (the social features driving) what we 
would call pathologies of consumption-esteem. For they are mainly concerned with 
‘conspicuous consumption’ (Veblen 2007: 49-69; Honneth 2014: 201) as a means to 
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demonstrating one’s social superiority or improving one’s social status (whereas we are 
interested in consumption as an activity that is crucial for expressing and realising one’s 
individuality).   
11
 There is, thus, a similarity between a Hegelian account of the importance of private 
property for one’s identity and our claim that it is vital for individuals’ identity that they can 
understand their consumptive behaviour as manifesting their particular tastes, conceptions 
of the good etc. (Hegel, 1991: §46; Honneth, 2014: 75-78; Waldron, 1988: 370ff).  
12
 See below for an account of the difference between consumpion-esteem and 
consumption-respect.  
13
 European Parliament (2017) Same brand, lower quality: MEPs tackle unfair food practices. 
Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20171009STO85661/same-
brand-lower-quality-meps-tackle-unfair-food-practices  (accessed 12 March 2018). 
14
 For an argument for ‘workplace democracy’ both ‘at the level of the task and at the level 
of the organisation’, see Yeoman (2014: 3, 96-122, 154-184). 
15
 For a critical evaluation of one of the most prominent contemporary attempts to 
pragmatically hold on to the commitment to workplace democracy under the conditions of 
globalisation, see, for instance, Latinne’s account of the Mondragon cooperative, which was 
founded ‘as an industrial cooperative in the 1950s’ and is ‘now a transnational enterprise’ 
(Latinne, 2014: 1). 
16
 EUR-Lex (2015) Interpretative Notice on indication of origin of goods from the territories 
occupied by Israel since June 1967 (2015/C 375/05). Available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015XC1112%2801%29 
(Accessed 4 June 2018). 
17
 We are agnostic in this paper regarding the question of whether all pathologies in the 
economic sphere are pathologies of misrecognition. All we are claiming is that our expanded 
taxonomy of misrecognition in the market will prove helpful for anyone attempting to 
diagnose pathologies of misrecognition in this sphere. 
18
 For an overview of the changes Honneth’s views on social pathology have undergone and 
a critical evaluation of them, see Freyenhagen (2015). 
